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Abstract
Can trade agreements be used as a tool for improving the conditions under which people work? The evidence from this
study suggests this is not the case, even if the country in question—in this instance South Korea—is a well-developed and
democratic country. While over the past six years South Korea has taken part in a number of Free Trade Agreements con-
taining labour provisions, the impact of these on enabling rights has been rather low. This would suggest that without the
willingness to enforce these parts of the agreements, or without the willingness to implement them on the Korean side,
the inclusion of such provisions remains a fairly symbolic undertaking.
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1. Introduction
The large amount of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
that have been negotiated over the past 25 years—by
now involving all World Trade Organization (WTO) mem-
bers (WTO, 2017a)—demonstrates the importance that
States attach to increasing trade as an engine for eco-
nomic growth. However, FTAs might also lead to a sit-
uation in which countries try to increase their competi-
tiveness by continuously keeping their labour standards
lower than other countries, or even lowering them. This
concern is illustrated by a recent statement of inter-
national trade unions: “International trade and invest-
ment agreements have contributed to growing imbal-
ances between and within countries. Opaque negotia-
tion processes resulted in one-sided protection of in-
vestors’ rights, while labour and social rights…came un-
der attack” (Labour 20 [L20], 2017).
While research on the relationship between FTAs
and labour protection has resulted in mixed outcomes,1
FTAs are increasingly seen as providing an opportunity
to set minimum standards for the signatory countries.
This is illustrated by the fact that in 2013, almost 25%
of the trade agreements registered at the WTO as be-
ing concluded or notified included labour standards pro-
visions (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2015,
p. 19). Although such inclusion could be perceived as
a demonstration of a protectionist interest, it can also
be viewed as an illustration of a concern for other
matters related to trade than purely economic ones.
Whichever argument prevails, labour standards provi-
sions make trade agreements easier to accept for those
critical of the social effects of globalisation in general
and trade agreements in particular. As such, the provi-
sions increase support for trade agreements in more de-
veloped countries.2
1 For example, research by Davies and Vadlamannati (2013) and Olney (2013) found that countries compete in the area of labour standards to attract
foreign direct investment, while Potrafke (2013) argues that globalization does not lead to a deregulation of the labour market.
2 See Van Roozendaal (2015).
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But are these provisions just paying lip service to
labour standards’ improvements? This article uses the
case of South Korea to show how its many FTAs formu-
late different labour standards provisions, and analyses
the effects of this comprehensive body of commitments
and accompanying instruments. It concludes that the ef-
fects are largely symbolic.
2. The Korean Case
Until now research has shown that labour provisions in
trade agreements have had a limited influence on ac-
tual labour standards. It has been suggested that more
in-depth case studies are required to identify possible ef-
fects (Giumelli & Van Roozendaal, 2016). This article, pre-
senting an in-depth study of Korea,3 analyses the effects
of a set of provisions in the agreements related to the fun-
damental enabling conventions in the field of freedom
of association and the right to organise.4 Korea is inter-
esting because it is a democratic and developed country
(Freedom House, 2017; World Bank, 2017), which sug-
gests it potentially has the political will and means to
maintain a high level of labour standards. The importance
of democracy for enabling labour rights was pointed out
by, amongst others, Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash (2009,
p. 678),5 and the importance of economic development
by Giumelli and Van Roozendaal (2016, pp. 56–57). In
addition, the potential influence of dependence on FTA
partner countries as export destinations was shown by
Frankowski (2015, pp. 11–12), Greenhill et al. (2009) and
Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006). The US and the EU, two
of its FTA partners, were in 2014 the second and third ex-
port destination (almost 20% of its exports). While this is
by no means “dependency”, it could make a difference.
The study takes a different approach thanmost of the
other research on labour provisions in trade agreements;
instead of focussing on one FTA, it takes a country—
Korea—as a point of departure and looks at the impact of
all FTAs incorporating labour standards. It demonstrates
that even though these agreements together include a
broad range of provisions, there are no effects on en-
abling rights. This is interesting, not only due to the
potential for change on the receiving end as was just
pointed out, but also due to the fact that the trade agree-
ments facilitate different kinds of institutional arrange-
ments which enable implementation, and involve a wide
variety of trading partners, including major ones who
should be able to exert pressure.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the FTAs’
labour provisions on the ratification of the enabling fun-
damental Conventions and the related laws and prac-
tices, this article uses a simple definition of effectiveness
of the Korean FTAs, making a difference between out-
put and impact, the former referring to “the norms, prin-
ciples and rules constituting the regime itself” and the
latter to “the set of consequences flowing from the im-
plementation of and adjustment to that regime” (Under-
dal, 1992, p. 230). Referring to van den Putte (2016), Or-
bie and Van Roozendaal point out in the editorial of this
special issue that impact refers to intermediate impact
(development, empowerment, institution building and
legal improvement) and ultimate impact (labour prac-
tices). Whether such impact is positive can be measured
against the “relative improvement standard”. This stan-
dard is met when the inclusion of a provision leads to an
improvement in the situation relative to that which ex-
isted before (Underdal, 1992, p. 231).
This article analyses the different Korean FTAs that in-
clude labour standards to understand what kind of con-
ditions and incentives they contain (the output). This is
followed by an analysis of the effects and an explana-
tion of the lack of effect (the impact). The output will be
assessed on the basis of the original texts of the agree-
ments, while the impact will be assessed through a sys-
tematic analysis of reports of the USDepartment of State
(US DOS), the US Department of Labor (US DOL), UN re-
ports (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association; ILO Committee on
the Application of Standards; ILO Committee on the Free-
dom of Association [CFA]) and the International Trade
Union Confederation (ITUC).
3. The Output: Labour Provisions in Korean FTAs
At the beginning of 2017, Korea had signed 16 FTAs (Asia
Regional Integration Center [ARIC], n.d.), eight of which
include substantial and distinctive references to labour
standards. The eight with substantial references can be
distinguished along the lines of: (1) the content, i.e. the
kind of labour standards they refer to and the strength of
the wording, and (2) the procedures (or implementation
mechanisms) in place to ensure or stimulate compliance
(see part 4).
3.1. EU–Korea FTA as an Example
With respect to the content, one can usually make a dif-
ference between references to the principles or rights en-
shrined in the core labour standards (CLS)6 of the ILO as
a baseline (ILO, 2012, pp. 1–2), or to references to an al-
ternative package.
The FTA of Korea with the EU,7 effectuated in July
3 In this article, South Korea will be referred to as Korea.
4 “enabling rights make it possible to promote and realize decent conditions at work” (ILO, 2017a).
5 However, the study of Giumelli and Van Roozendaal (2016, p. 19), which equated political will with democracy, did not see an effect of being a democratic
country on the level of respect for labour rights. Given the fact that others found other results, this variable should not be ruled out.
6 CLS refer to the rights and principles being part of Conventions 29 and 105 (on forced labour), 87 and 98 (on freedom of association and right to
organise), 100 and 111 (non-discrimination) and child labour (138 and 182) (ILO, 2012, p. 1).
7 The full text of the FTAs referred to in this article can be found on the website of the Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy: http://english.
motie.go.kr/en/if/ftanetwork/ftanetwork.jsp
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2011, is in terms of content themost comprehensive one
and will, therefore, be used as an example. It specifically
refers to Article 13.4.3 to CLS. Its international commit-
ments includes “respecting, promoting and realising, in
their laws and practices, the principles concerning the
fundamental rights” and reaffirms “the commitment to
effectively implementing the ILO Conventions that Korea
and the Member States of the EU have ratified respec-
tively” (Article 13.4.3), and to “make continued and sus-
tained efforts towards ratifying the fundamental ILO Con-
ventions as well as the other Conventions that are classi-
fied as ‘up-to-date’ by the ILO”(Article 13.4.3).
With a national focus, the FTA specifies that “(a) Party
shall not fail to effectively enforce its…labour laws, through
a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in
a manner affecting trade or investment between the Par-
ties” (Article 13.7.1). At the same time, the FTA instructs
that “the Parties shall not weaken or reduce the…labour
protections afforded in its laws to encourage trade or in-
vestment, bywaiving or otherwise derogate from…its laws,
regulations or standards, in a manner affecting trade or in-
vestment between the Parties” (Article 13.7.2).
3.2. Other FTAs
With respect to international efforts on the content, the
FTAs with the US, Canada and Turkey all commit to CLS in
a similar fashion as the EU–Korea FTA does, while others
make use of a weaker formulation such as “shall endeav-
our to adopt andmaintain” (FTA with Peru and Australia)
or “shall strive to adopt and maintain” (FTAs with Colom-
bia and New Zealand).
With the exception of the FTA with the EU, none
of the FTAs oblige the parties to ratify the ILO Conven-
tions related to CLS, nor do they discuss the up-to-date
Conventions. However, the Canada-Korea agreement
has a longer list of internationally recognised labour
rights, extending it to employment standards in terms
of wages, occupation injuries and payments, and non-
discrimination of migrant workers (Article 8.2).
Just like the EU FTA, the FTA with Turkey also specifi-
cally urges the Parties to effectively implement the rat-
ified ILO Conventions. However, without an appeal to
also ratify these ILO Conventions, this FTA should be con-
sidered weaker than the EU–Korea FTA.
With respect to the references to domestic laws, all
FTAs include: (1) a commitment to enforce domestic
labour laws that have an effect on trade and investment,
and (2) a commitment not to weaken domestic labour
laws that have an effect on trade and investment.
Of the two, the first is formulated in the US–Korea
FTA as “neither Party shall fail to effectively enforce its
labor laws, including those it adopts or maintains in ac-
cordance with Article 19.2.1, through a sustained or re-
curring course of action or inaction, in a manner affect-
ing trade or investment between the parties” (Article
19.3.1[a] of the US–Korea FTA).8 However, in the case of
this FTA, Article 19.8 explicitly limits the phrase “labour
laws” to those laws covering CLS plus acceptable condi-
tions of work.
A phrase on not to weaken labour law in so far it
affects trade or investment is included in all FTAs. How-
ever, here one can also find different formulations. Again,
in the Korean FTAs with Canada, the US, Australia, New
Zealand and Peru references are made to those laws in
the area of the CLS. Canada refers to the extended list
here. To illustrate, in Article 18.2.2 of the Peru-Korea
maintains that “the Parties shall not waive or otherwise
derogate from…their laws or regulations implementing
Article 18.1, in a manner substantially affecting trade or
investment between the Parties, where the waiver or
derogation would be inconsistent with the principles as
stated in the ILO Declaration”. This suggests that the laws
already in place but not related to the CLS could indeed
be weakened. However, the FTA with Turkey includes a
more comprehensive formulation, i.e. “each Party shall
not weaken or reduce the…labour protections afforded
in its laws to encourage trade and investment, bywaiving
or otherwise derogating from…regulations or standards,
in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties” (Article 5.7.2). Here, the point of reference con-
cerns the domestic legislation and not only CLS-related
principles and therefore offers more potential than the
Peru-Korea FTA, but is still potentially weaker than the
EU–Korea FTA, as there is nothing in the Turkey–Korea
agreement on ratifying the Conventions related to CLS. A
ratified Convention entails stronger commitments than a
CLS, which makes the EU–Korea FTA with its incentive to
ratify stronger than the Turkey–Korean one. A similar ob-
servation regarding the Turkey–Korea FTA can be made
concerning the Colombia–Korea FTA.
In sum, the references on enforcement and deroga-
tion can be broad and restricted at the same time. Broad
because in some cases domestic labour law is included,
and not only the laws connected to CLS. This avoids
the limitation of some of the FTAs in their reference on
“waive and derogate” that all other—non-CLS related do-
mestic law affecting trade—can be weakened.9 Another
limitation is the connection made to trade in both ref-
erences. In addition, with respect to CLS, the references
can be limited in another way. In cases where CLS are not
part of domestic law, both references only havemeaning
for CLS if the FTAs also contain a strong commitment to
include CLS in domestic law.
3.3. Additional References on Protectionism
Additional references in the FTAs are at times made to
not using labour standards for protectionist purposes,
such as is done in the FTAs with the EU, New Zealand,
Australia and Turkey. For example, the Australia–Korea
agreement specifies that “each Party recognises that it
8 Article 19.2.1 refers to CLS.
9 A similar observation can be made with respect to the enforcement reference in the US–Korea FTA.
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is inappropriate to use its labour laws, regulations, prac-
tices and policies for trade protectionist purposes” (Arti-
cle 17.1.5). Article 13.2.2. of the EU–Korea FTA and ar-
ticle 5.2.1 of the Turkey–Korea FTA are even stronger
with respect to this commitment; “The Parties stress
that…labour standards should not be used for protection-
ist trade purposes”. Article 15.2.5 of the New Zealand–
Korea FTA is stronger as it specifies that “each Party
shall ensure that its labour laws, regulations, policies
and practices shall not be used for trade protectionist
purposes”. Especially in the cases of Australia and New
Zealand, such references could also be viewed as a (in
case of Australia—weak) substitute for restricting the
“waive and derogate” formulation to CLS. However, as
the New Zealand and Australia FTAs have only a weak
commitment to including CLS in domestic laws, expec-
tations are low regarding the obligations. The above is
summarised in the table.
When taken together, the body of FTA commitments
applying to Korea that include: (1) an appeal to Korea to
ratify the ILO Conventions related to CLS, as well as the
up-to-date Conventions, as well as commitments to (2)
implementing ratified ILO Conventions; (3) realising ad-
ditional internationally recognised labour rights; (4) not
failing to enforce domestic labour laws, including those
related to CLS when it is affecting trade and investment,
and (5) not weakening domestic regulation (also cover-
ing CLS) in order to increase competitiveness.
Table 1. The content of the FTAs with Korea.
Agreements in Strong Ratification Commitment Not failing Not to waive Protectionism
order of date commitment to of to to enforce and derogate reference
of enforcement CLS in domestic conventions implement domestic from domestic
laws and promoted ratified labour labour laws
regulations Conventions laws* (general or
related to
CLS)**
EU–Korea Yes (and Yes Yes Yes Domestic laws Yes
(July 2011) up-to-date and CLS
Conventions) (through
ratification
reference)
Peru–Korea No (weak No No Yes Limited to CLS No
(August 2011) formulation)
US–Korea Yes No No Yes, but Limited to CLS No
(March 2012) limited to
CLS and
acceptable
conditions
of work
Turkey–Korea Yes No Yes Yes Domestic Yes
(May 2013) laws and
“protectionism
reference”
Australia–Korea No (weak No No Yes Limited to CLS Yes (weak
(December 2014) formulation) formulation)
Canada–Korea Yes No No Yes, but Limited to CLS No
(January 2015) (extended list) limited to (but extended
“mutually- list)
recognized
labour law”
Colombia–Korea No (weak No No Yes Domestic laws No
(July 2015) formulation)
New Zealand–Korea No (weak No No Yes Limited to CLS Yes
(December 2015) formulation)
* Those FTAs with a strong commitment to adopting CLS in domestic legislation will also cover, implicitly, CLS.
** See previous note.
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4. The Output: Implementation Mechanisms of the
Agreements
The agreements discussed above are to be implemented
through a number of instruments, such as monitoring
arrangements, and may provide for weaker or stronger
dispute settlement procedures. They have established
bodies concerned with the implementation of the agree-
ment which serve as contact points for the parties and fa-
cilitate cooperation between them. However, the main
differences between the FTAs are whether they allow,
or even mandate, the involvement of the public, by for
example accepting complaints and whether it is possi-
ble to use the agreement’s dispute settlement, whether
another kind of mechanism is devised, or whether dis-
putes should be resolved through dialogue. Related to
this is the question whether or not the bodies handling
disputes have any sort of independence.
4.1. Institutions and Accessibility
In terms of the institutions and their accessibility, the
US–Korea FTA combines individual communications (the
option to file complaints by individuals or organizations)
with the involvement of “the public” on a national and
international level (van den Putte, 2015). Nationally,
the US–Korea FTA specifically allows for —but does not
require—the involvement of stakeholders to advise on
the implementation (Article 19.5.4.). On the US side,
this FTA is monitored by a national advisory commit-
tee (NAC), which advises the Department of Labor and
the US Trade Representative. NAC includes representa-
tives from the public (often experts fromacademia), busi-
ness and labour (US DOL, 2017a). Internationally, arti-
cle 19.5.1 provides for the establishment of the Labor
Affairs Council (LAC), made up of representatives of the
Ministries of the Parties. The LAC is concerned with dis-
cussing the implementation of the labour provisions, in-
cluding discussing them with the public. In addition, un-
der article 19.5.3 the Parties need to provide an oppor-
tunity for people to submit communications to be re-
viewed by the labourministry of each country, which will
decide whether it is willing to proceed with them. The
FTA with Canada also allows for the submission of com-
munications by the public to a governmental organisa-
tion (Article 18.10).
In terms of public involvement, the EU–Korea agree-
ment has put more emphasis on collective approach
than the US and Canadian agreements. This FTA requires
that a Committee on Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment (consisting of government officials) be founded
and requires each Party to “establish a Domestic Advi-
sory Group(s) on sustainable development (environment
and labour) with the task of advising on the implemen-
tation of this Chapter” (Article 13.12.4). Such a Group
involves “independent representative organisations of
civil society in a balanced representation of environment,
labour and business organisations as well as other rel-
evant stakeholders” (Article 13.12.5). It is required that
the members of these groups will meet—in principle—
once a year in the form of a civil society forum to dis-
cuss “encompassing sustainable development aspects of
trade relations between the Parties” (Article 13.3.1). The
Parties can inform the Forum on further developments
concerning the implementation of the Chapter, and the
opinion of the Forum can be brought to the attention of
the Parties and the Domestic Advisory Groups. The New
Zealand–Korea FTA allows specifically for its Labour Com-
mittee (comprising of government officials), established
under the agreement, to consult with stakeholders (Arti-
cle 15.4.5), but this is not a requirement. The FTAs with
Colombia, Peru, Australia, and Turkey do not allow for
the receipt of individual complaints; neither do they pro-
vide other opportunities for public involvement.
4.2. Dispute Settlement
In terms of the settlement of disputes, the US–Korea
FTA is the most comprehensive. In the US–Korea FTA,
disputes arising from the agreement may be settled in
different ways. By means of Article 19.7, after consul-
tations have failed, the dispute settlement chapter can
be evoked. The Panel involved in this dispute settle-
ment should be independent and can decide to evoke
measures, including trade sanctions, that are similar to
those used for other parts of the agreement, to enforce
labour provision obligations (Grimmett, 2012).10 Under
the Canada-Korea FTA a procedure is available which al-
lows for fines in the form of an “annual monetary assess-
ment equivalent to the degree of adverse trade effects
related to the non-compliance” (Annex 18-E). It does not
allow the regular FTA dispute settlement procedure to be
evoked for this article. The article further mandates this
fine to be used to implement “the action plan or other ap-
propriatemeasures” (Canada–Korea FTA). Both FTAs stip-
ulate that violations can only be established in so far as
these violations have an effect on trade and investment.
All the other agreements have weaker provisions, ex-
cluding sanctions. The EU–Korea FTA does not allow for
the general dispute settlement mechanism to be applied
to the labour chapter. Instead, it has devised a specific
mechanism for this purpose. The Committee on Trade
and Sustainable Development (CTSD) could be involved if
Parties are unable to solve an issue and request the Com-
mittee to come up with a solution. The Committee may
consult the Domestic Advisory Group(s), which may also
provide their opinion without being consulted. In case of
there being a dispute the Parties cannot resolve them-
selves; they may request the involvement of a Panel of
Independent Experts. The Panel’s conclusions are, how-
10 However, a side letter exchange between the US and Korea shows that both Parties agree that when communications are requested on a certain topic
not only should this be first handled domestically, but the matter should not be already under consideration by an international body and should not
be already subject to another communication between the parties (United States Trade Representative, 2007).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 19–29 23
ever, non-binding and there is no provision for sanctions
(Durán, 2013, p. 138). The FTAswith Colombia, Peru, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and Turkey have also chosen to set-
tle disputes through dialogue. In these cases, there is no
independent mechanism available, and there are no en-
forcement mechanisms.
In sum, when all the FTAs’ commitments on imple-
mentation are taken into account, they refer to a body
of commitments applying to Korea that include: (1) the
undertaking of cooperation activities;11 (2) the involve-
ment of civil society; (3) the opportunity to file com-
plaints; (4) procedures to deal with disputes, which could
involve independent experts, as well as (5) the applica-
tion of sanctions. The question now is whether all these
institutional arrangements have affected change in law
or practice in Korea in the area of the right to organise
and the right to freedom of association.
5. The Impact of the Agreements
The above shows that together the agreements contain-
ing labour references amount to a comprehensive body
of language and implementation instruments. It will be
analysed whether any of the instruments involving civil
society, filing of complaints, enactment of dispute proce-
dures, and the application of sanctions have been used.
The first FTA with Korea containing labour standards, the
one with the EU, came into force in mid-2011. That year
will, therefore, be the starting point of the analysis.
5.1. Impact on Ratification
With respect to the ratification, there is no intermedi-
ate impact of the FTAs. Korea has not ratified Conven-
tions 87 and 98 (covering the freedom of association,
right to organise and the right to collective bargaining)
(ILO, 2017b). In 2016 the Korean government made clear
that it could not, due to “legal incompatibilities”, ratify
these two Conventions, nor Conventions 29 and 105 (ILO,
2017c, 3, 6, 10).12
5.2. Other Kinds of Impact
The assessment of the situation in Korea differs greatly.
In 2011, a report of theUSDOL concluded that “theROK’s
labor laws and practices are largely consistent with in-
ternational standards governing the internationally rec-
ognized labor rights articulated in Chapter 19 of the KO-
RUS”, to a great extent due to Korea’s accession to the
OECD (US DOL, 2011, p. 10). On the other hand, the ITUC
(2016a) classifies Korea as a country where workers’ en-
abling rights are not guaranteed by law. It rated the coun-
try with a five, meaning that it is amongst “the worst
countries in the world to work in” (ITUC, 2016a, 2016b).
As five is the secondworst category,13 it is safe to assume
that the FTAs which have been signed did not improve
the situation.
Whatever the general observation, it is clear that
there are significant problems in the areas of freedom
of association and the right to collective action, as well
as with regards to the right to strike. While these rights
are guaranteed for most workers, there are important
exceptions and omissions in the law that have not been
amended following the conclusion of the FTAs, and nei-
ther have the practices been changed; for this Korea re-
ceived strong criticism.14
5.3. Specific Problems
5.3.1. Freedom of Association
National laws may deny, restrict or not acknowledge
the freedom of association and collective bargaining of
certain categories of workers, such as defence industry
workers, teachers, particular categories of public offi-
cials, undocumented workers, those that have been dis-
missed or self-employed workers, and as the 2016 UN’s
Special Rapporteur’s report illustrates, these limitations
have not been lifted since the FTAs came into force (Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and of association, 2016, pp. 12–13).
Some associations, such as of those who are self-
employed, are not acknowledged under Korean law.
Some transportation and construction workers are in-
cluded in this category. Any agreement such organisation
makes is therefore non-binding. Unions allowing mem-
bership to people who have been dismissed face denial
of registration or the de-certification of the whole union.
In the case of the Korean Teachers and Education Work-
ers Union, this means that 60,000 people cannot organ-
ise because of the membership of nine fired workers,
while the 10,000 public servants who are allowed to be
members of the Korean Government Employees Union
(KGEU) cannot be represented as the union’s constitution
does not rule out the membership of dismissed workers
(Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association, 2016, p. 13). Evenwhen the
KGEU amended its constitution, the Korean government
denied registration of the union on grounds of “alleged
lack of political neutrality” (Domestic Advisory Group-EU
11 Cooperation activities will not be discussed in this article as cooperation is not exclusively part of trade agreements but can take place throughmultiple
forms, which makes it difficult to understand the specific effects of cooperation under FTAs.
12 Korea has also not ratified Conventions 29 and 105 (on forced labour) due to “inability” (ILO, 2017c, p. 10). The other fundamental Conventions, 138
and 182 (on child labour) and 110 and 111 (non-discrimination,) were ratified before 2004. The FTAs discussed in this article involve countries with
different levels of ratification, from the EU countries, having signed Conventions 87 and 98, and the US failing to have signed both (ILO, 2017b).
13 The categories range from 1 (the best protection) to 5+ (the worst protection). In the 5+ category are countries that do not guarantee workers’ rights,
as the rule of law is not respected. In category 5 countries “legislation may spell out certain rights workers have effectively no access to these rights
and are therefore exposed to autocratic regimes and unfair labour practices” (ITUC, 2016b).
14 The length of the article does not allow a detailed overview of all laws and practices related to the enabling rights. Such overview is provided by the
2016 report of the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and the 2011 report of the US DOL.
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[DAG-EU], 2014). In general, teachers are granted the
freedom of association, but only under certain condi-
tions. The lawpermits the blocking of the teachers’ union
and public officials from engaging the political activities,
providing a very broad interpretation of what political
activities entail, which strongly limits the possibility of
these groups to voice their concerns which has been
heavily criticised by the ILO (Special Rapporteur on the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of associa-
tion, 2016, p. 12; US DOL, 2011, pp. 17–19). In addition,
unions of teachers and public officials have restricted
rights with respect to what is collectively bargained for
(US DOS, 2010, p. 19, 2017, p. 28).
Certain categories of public officials are not permit-
ted to join a union at all. In 2010 the Korean Federation
of Trade Unions (KCTU) and its affiliated Korean Profes-
sors Trade Union filed a complaint to the ILO’s CFA, as
this subcategory of teachers is not granted the right to
organise. The CFA concluded that revision of the law was
needed to amend this restriction (CFA, 2010), a revision
which still has yet to be made.
In 2011, undocumented immigrants were not
granted the right to join a union.15 The Migrants’ Trade
Union (MTU) was established in 2005 but was not recog-
nised on grounds that there were undocumented work-
ers among its members. It took the courts years to de-
cide upon this case, which led the ILO’s Committee on
Freedom of Association to express its concerns about
this and about the infringement of trade union activities
of migrants in general (CFA, 2010, 2011, 2013; US DOL,
2011, p. 14). In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that un-
documentedmigrants also have a right to organise (ITUC,
2015), leading to the recognition of MTU.16
5.3.2. Right to Strike
The right to strike is also severely limited. All public ser-
vants, defence industry workers and teachers are denied
the right to strike, as well as those working in essen-
tial public services, the latter category again being very
broadly defined. Many of these limitations conflict with
international law (Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, 2016,
p. 15; US DOL, 2011, pp. 22–23, 27).
One of the most important problems facing Korean
unions is the hostile environment in which they operate.
The Korean criminal act allows for heavy fines for trade
unionists who are engaged in activities that “obstruct
business”, even if these activities are non-violent. This ba-
sically limits the collective action of unions (Special Rap-
porteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly
and of association, 2016, p. 15; US DOL, 2011, pp. 10–11).
In fact, it is up to the authorities to affirm a strike’s legal-
ity. This has created significant scope for the authorities
to silence opposition. For example, a strike of the Korean
Railway Workers not only resulted in the arrest of union
members and leaders and the dismissal of workers, but
also in lawsuits against the union and some of its officers
by KORAIL, demanding about 8 million euro (DAG-EU,
2014; Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, 2016, p. 15). To
quote the UN special rapporteur:
industrial action, particularly strike action, by its na-
ture is designed to interrupt the normal operations of
a business or employer in order to press for certain in-
terests; they are inherently disruptive. Strikes should
thus be adopted with a great deal of circumspection,
but that does not mean they can be arbitrarily sup-
pressed. Criminal and civil liability for loss of revenue
or other damages arising fromwork stoppage negates
the very core of the right to strike. (Special Rapporteur
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, 2016, p. 15)
6. How to Understand the Lack of Impact?
The above leads to the conclusion that the FTAs have not
made a difference in the area of enabling rights.17 While
the FTAs provide output,meaning that they include provi-
sions that reaffirm regulation, and create an institutional
infrastructure, this has not let to any impacts in Korea,
compared to the pre-FTA situation, with the exception
of the creation of institutions and, as Engen (2017, p. 52)
argues, more disclosure of violations as a result of the EU
DAG’s activities. This may increase the empowerment of
civil society. However, a causal ultimate impact could not
be established.
This failure of the labour provisions in the FTAs to
improve enabling rights in Korea could be understood
as the result of both endogenous and exogenous fac-
tors, the first being those provided by the agreement
provisions themselves, the latter being those which
are part of the environment in which the agreements
were executed.
6.1. Endogenous Factors
The total of commitments and procedures that can be
derived from the FTAs with Korea are extensive, but un-
derused or simply ineffective. While complaints proce-
dures are included in the US–Korea and Canada–Korea
FTAs, Korea has not yet received any complaints (Inter-
national Cooperation Division, Ministry of Employment
15 Migrant workers in general face discrimination and abuse. Even though the Korean government has undertaken some steps to improve their situation,
this is not considered to be enough (Committee on the Application of Standards, 2013, p. 38, individual cases).
16 This change, however, is not seen as an impact of the EU FTA (Soyeon Jeong, Korean labour law attorney, email correspondence, May 26, 2017) even
though in 2013 the EU DAG demanded attention for this issue (Engen, 2017, p. 51). An interesting line of research would be to look into if and how the
judicial system has responded to the agreements (see for example the article Riethof, 2017, in this issue).
17 Also the other contribution in this thematic issue on the impact of FTAs, the article by Orbie, van den Putte and Martens (2017) on the EU FTA with
Peru, shows a lack of positive effects.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 19–29 25
and Labor, Government of Korea, personal communica-
tion, February 10, 2017; Trade Policy and Negotiations
Branch, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada,
Government of Canada, personal communication, April
28, 2017; US DOL, 2017b). Such complaints could make
a difference in terms of putting violations on the politi-
cal map (see Oehri, 2017; Van Roozendaal, 2015), even
though they might not actually change the situation. Ad-
ditionally, the fact that under the same two FTAs obliga-
tions with respect to labour can only be violated when
they affect trade and investment is also a strong limita-
tion to the application of sanctions, as many of the prob-
lems discussed do not necessarily involve sectors which
are trade-related. And even if the applicationwerewider,
one should keep in mind that sanctions, or the threat of
sanctions, do not necessarily lead to (big) improvements
(Giumelli & Van Roozendaal, 2016, p. 19; Greenhill et al.,
2009, p. 681; Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 614).
While an official submissions process is not part of
any of the other FTAs, this does not mean that civil so-
ciety organisations do not undertake any activities. For
example, the European DAG (which also includes Euro-
pean employers’ representatives) did submit a letter of
complaint to the European Commission in January 2014.
This letter urged the Commission to invoke consultations
with Korea regarding the implementation of the ratified
Conventions, and of the ratification of some of the core
Conventions and their subsequent implementation, stat-
ing that it was “deeply troubled by the Government’s
blatant disregard for international labour standards in
practice” (DAG-EU, 2014). The EU does address labour
issues in the Committee on Trade and Sustainable De-
velopment (CTSD) (see for example CTSD, 2015), but ap-
parently without much success when it comes to en-
abling rights. In April 2017, the European Parliament re-
quested that the Commission “take up formal consulta-
tions with the Government of Korea…and, if such consul-
tations should fail, call on the panel or experts…to take
action and to continue dialogue with regard to the fail-
ure of the Korean Government to comply with some of
its commitments, and in particular to make continued
and sustained efforts…towards ensuring the ratification
by Korea of the fundamental ILO Conventions which this
country has not ratified yet” (European Parliament [EP],
2017, p. 6).
Only the EU–Korea, New Zealand–Korea and US–
Korea FTAs allow for the involvement of civil society in
terms of monitoring the FTAs.18 Such an option does
not necessarily lead to success, as van den Putte (2015)
shows in a comparison of the strength of the US–Korea
and the EU–Korea FTAs in terms of civil society involve-
ment. In the case of the US FTA with Korea, the problem
is that the US’ nationalmechanism has to deal withmany
FTAs’ labour provisions while many of the members lack
both interest and expertise in South Korea. Van den Putte
also considers the US’ international mechanism for pub-
lic involvement to be weak and shows that the situation
is only slightly better for the EU–Korea FTA. Similar inef-
fectiveness is confirmed by a 2016 study commissioned
by the Korean branch of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
which concludes that “Chapter 13 Trade and Sustainable
Development of the Korea–EU FTA failed to be a means
of pressure for the South Korean government to bring
about substantial changes in the country’s labour prac-
tices, but only worked to call attention to the matter”
(FES, 2016, p. 3). Campling, Harrison, Richardson and
Smith (2016) also suggest that the effectiveness in the
labour area of the EU–Korea FTA suffers from “the com-
bination of weak domestic advisory groups, a “trade and
sustainable development” chapter that lacks any mech-
anism to arbitrate disputes or impose penalties, and the
absence of political will on the part of the EU” (Campling
et al., 2016, p. 370). In sum, there is little impact of the
FTAs’ provisions and procedures on the enabling rights’
practices as some, such as sanctions, have not been used
whereas other mechanisms have, such as the involve-
ment of civil society, although this has not yet led to con-
crete effects regarding enabling rights.
6.2. Exogenous Factor
The above observation made by Campling et al. (2016),
brings us to the main exogenous factor of importance in
explaining the ineffectiveness of the FTAs; the lack of po-
litical interest, despite the fact that the EU and US, be-
ing particularly important export destinations for Korea
could have some leverage.19 The weak provisions in the
labour chapters illustrate, not surprisingly, that the eco-
nomic goals of FTAs trump normative ones (see for exam-
ple on the EU–Korea FTA, Frankowski, 2015, p. 14; Gruni,
2017, p. 115).
On the Korean side, the political will to improve
labour standards is also lacking, and trade unions oper-
ate in an adverse political climate, despite the fact that
Korea is a democracy and a developed country. The will-
ingness of the subsequent Korean governments (and es-
pecially the conservative ones) to initiate changes to the
domestic laws in order to ratify the last four Conventions
is lacking (FES, 2016, p. 3; Gruni, 2017, pp. 114–115).
7. Conclusion
Korea has signedmultiple FTAs, which include labour pro-
visions, even relatively strong ones. The empirical evi-
18 While the New Zealand Labour Committee has met at the end of 2016, the records of this meeting are not made public (FTA Implementation Unit,
Trade Negotiations Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, email correspondence, February 15, 2017). The records of the two US
NACmeetings show that the issues of the obstruction of business code, migrant workers and non-regular workers were only touched upon superficially
(NAC, 2013, 2014). The involvement of civil society with respect to the EU-Korea FTA is more comprehensive. Until this date, the EU-DAG has had
13 meetings and the civil society forum five.
19 For Australia, it might even work the other way around, as Korea is its third most important export destination (WTO, 2017b), which might make
Australia cautious about making improvement of CLS in Korea to trade an important subject for dialogue.
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dence in this research suggests that while there has been
an intermediate impact in terms of institution building
and the increased international attention for violations,
this had no impact on practices in Korea itself. In other
words, no relative improvement has taken place, leading
to a situation in which the labour provisions serve, from
the point of view of stimulating improvements, only a
symbolic purpose.
The absence of an ultimate impact can best be ex-
plained by the lack of political will on the Korean side (as
for example illustrated by the Korean government’s refer-
ences to the incompatibility of some of the ILO Conven-
tions with national law) on the one hand, and an equal
lack of readiness on the trade partners’ sides to either in-
clude strong wording and a strong instrument to back up
any commitment, or to actually use the available instru-
ments in a way which would lead to improvement. This
comes as no surprise, as the FTAs are first and foremost
instruments designed to facilitate trade and investment.
This raises the serious question of whether the inclu-
sion of labour provisions is helpful in improving labour
rightswhen they are not backed up by political will. If one
looks at them favourably, the contacts such agreements
facilitate between governmental and non-governmental
actors may help to increase the willingness and ability
to act, even in areas that have no link with trade and in-
vestment. However, the current lack of effectiveness of
labour provisions in FTAs shows that they should not be
seen as a substitute for the other initiatives outlined in
this thematic issue.
Acknowledgments
The author wants to express her gratitude to Paula Köh-
ler for her invaluable research assistance, to members
of the trade union, NGO and research community in Ko-
rea who provided background information and guidance,
to the anonymous reviewers for their comments, to Jus-
tine Jones for her language suggestions, and to Jan Or-
bie for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
This article is based on the unpublished paper “Labour
Standards as an ‘Afterthought’ in Trade Agreements: The
South Korea Case” that I presented at the 2016 EUIA Con-
ference in Brussels, May 2016.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Asia Regional Integration Center. (n.d.). Free trade agree-
ments. Website Asian Regional Integration Center.
Retrieved from https://aric.adb.org/fta
Campling, L., Harrison, J., Richardson, B., & Smith, A.
(2016). Can labour provisions work beyond the bor-
der? Evaluating the effects of EU free trade agree-
ments. International Labour Review, 155(3), 357–381.
Committee on the Application of Standards. (2013). Ex-
tracts from the record of proceedings. Geneva: Inter-
national Labour Organization.
Committee on the Freedom of Association. (2010). 358th
report of the committee on freedom of associa-
tion. Case no.2620. Geneva: International Labour
Organization.
Committee on the Freedomof Association. (2011). 362nd
report of the committee on freedom of associa-
tion. Case no. 2620. Geneva: International Labour
Organization.
Committee on the Freedom of Association. (2013). 367th
report of the committee on freedom of associa-
tion. Case no. 2620. Geneva: International Labour
Organization.
Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development.
(2015). Joint statement of the 4th meeting of the Com-
mittee on Trade and Sustainable Development under
the Korea–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Seoul on
9 September 2015. Brussels: European Commission.
Davies, R., & Vadlamannati, K. (2013). A race to the bot-
tom in labor standards? An empirical investigation.
Journal of Development Economics, 103, 1–14.
Domestic Advisory Group-EU. (2014). Serious violations
of Chapter 13 of the EU–Korea FTA. Letter to Karel de
Gucht. January 13. Domestic Advisory Group under
the EU–Korea FTA. Retrieved from http://www.
finunions.org/files/225/Letter_to_Mr_Karel_De_Gu
cht_Art_13-_Korea_-FTA.pdf
Durán, G. (2013). Innovations and implications of the
trade and sustainable development chapter in the
EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement. In J. Harrison (Ed.),
The European Union and South Korea: The legal
framework for strengthening trade, economic andpo-
litical relations (pp. 124–146). Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Engen, L. (2017). Labour provisions in Asia-Pacific
Free Trade Agreements (Background paper no.1,
Ninth Tranche of the Development Account Project).
Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific.
European Parliament. (2017). Report on the implemen-
tation of the Free Trade Agreement between the
European Union and the Republic of Korea (Report
no. 2015/2059(INI)). Brussels: Committee on Interna-
tional Trade.
Frankowski, P. (2015, June 30–July 1). Labor standards
and external promotion of European norms. Paper
presented at the Governance and Economic Inte-
gration through Free Trade Agreements workshop,
Keele, UK. Retrieved fromhttp://giftaproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Frankowski-2015Paper.pdf
Freedom House. (2017). Freedom in the world. Pop-
ulists and autocrats: The dual threat to global
democracy. Freedom House. Retrieved from https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2017
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (2016). Evaluation of the Korea–
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 19–29 27
EU FTA’s labour standards provisions and their im-
plementation status. South Korea: Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung.
Giumelli, F., & Van Roozendaal, G. (2016). Trade agree-
ments and labour standards clauses: Explaining
labour standards developments through a qualitative
comparative analysis of US free trade agreements.
Global Social Policy, 17(1), 38–61.
Greenhill, B., Mosley, L., & Prakash, A. (2009). Trade-
based diffusion of labor rights: A panel study, ‘1986–
2002’. American Political Science Review, 103(4),
669–690.
Grimmett, J. (2012). Disputes settlement in the U.S.–
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).
Washington DC: Congressional Research Ser-
vice. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R41779.pdf
Gruni, G. (2017). Labour standards in the EU–Korea
Free Trade Agreement. Pushing labour standards into
global trade law? Korean Journal of International and
Comparative Law, 1(5), 100–121.
Hafner-Burton, E. (2005). Trading human rights: How
preferential trade agreements influence govern-
ment repression. International Organization, 59(3),
593–629.
International Labour Organization. (2012). Fundamental
principles and rights at work: From commitment to
action. Recurrent discussion under the ILO declara-
tion on social justice for a fair globalization and the
follow-up to the ILO declaration on fundamental
principles and rights at work (Report VI. Sixth item
on the agenda). Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/docu
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_176149.pdf
International Labour Organization. (2015). Social dimen-
sions of Free Trade Agreements: Revised edition.
Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/
wcms_228965.pdf
International Labour Organization. (2017a). Freedom
of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining. International Labour
Organization. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/
declaration/principles/freedomofassociation/lang--
en/index.htm
International Labour Organization. (2017b). Ratifications
for Korea, the Republic of. International Labour
Organization. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P112
00_COUNTRY_ID:103123
International Labour Organization. (2017c). Review
of annual reports under the follow-up to the ILO
declaration on fundamental principles and rights at
work. International Labour Organization. Retrieved
from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/
wcms_545463.pdf
International Trade Union Confederation. (2015). Korea:
Supreme court affirms right to unionise for undoc-
umented migrants. International Trade Union Con-
federation. Retrieved from https://www.ituc-csi.org/
korea-supreme-court-affirms-right?lang=en
International Trade Union Confederation. (2016a). The
2016 ITUC global rights index. The world’s worst
countries for workers. International Trade Union Con-
federation. Retrieved from https://www.ituc-csi.org/
IMG/pdf/ituc-violationmap-2016-en_final.pdf
International Trade Union Confederation. (2016b). De-
scription of ratings. International Trade Union Con-
federation. Retrieved from http://survey.ituc-csi.org/
IMG/pdf/description_of_ratings.pdf
Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2016).
Korea’s FTA network. KoreanMinistry of Trade, Indus-
try and Energy. Retrieved from http://english.motie.
go.kr/en/if/ftanetwork/ftanetwork.jsp
Labour20. (2017). L20 statement to the G20 labour
and employment ministers’ meeting. International
Trade Union Confederation. Retrieved from https://
www.ituc-csi.org/l20-statement-to-the-g20-labour
Meunier, S., & Nicolaïdis, K. (2006). The European Union
as a conflicted trade power. Journal of European Pub-
lic Policy, 13(6), 906–925.
National Advisory Committee. (2013, March 19). Min-
utes of meeting of the National Advisory Committee
for Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements. Wash-
ington, DC: United States Department of Labor.
National Advisory Committee. (2014, February 5). Min-
utes of meeting of the National Advisory Committee
for Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements. Wash-
ington, DC: United States Department of Labor.
Oehri, M. (2017). Civil society activism under US free
trade agreements: The effects of actorness on decent
work. Politics and Governance, 5(4), 40–48.
Olney,W. (2013). A race to the bottom? Employment pro-
tection and foreign direct investment. Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 91(2), 191–203.
Orbie, J., van den Putte, L., & Martens, D. (2017). The im-
pact of labour rights commitments in EU trade agree-
ments: The case of Peru. Politics and Governance,
5(4), 6–18.
Potrafke, N. (2013). Globalization and labor market insti-
tutions: International empirical evidence. Journal of
Comparative Economics, 41(3), 829–842.
Riethof, M. (2017). The international labour standards
debate in the Brazilian labour movement: Engage-
ment with Mercosur and opposition to the Free
Trade of the Americas. Politics and Governance, 5(4),
30–39.
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association. (2016). Report of the
special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peace-
ful assembly and of association on his mission to the
republic of Korea (Report No. A/HRC/32/36/Add.2).
Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner of the
United Nations for Human Rights. Retrieved from
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 19–29 28
http:%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2FEN%2FHRBodies%2
FHRC%2FRegularSessions%2FSession32%2FDocume
nts%2FA_HRC_32_36_Add.2_en.docx.
Underdal, A. (1992). The concept of regime effectiveness.
Cooperation and Conflict, 27(3), 227–240.
United States Department of Labor. (2011). Republic of
Korea. Labor rights report. Washington, DC: United
States Department of Labor.
United States Department of Labor. (2017a). National
Advisory Committee for labor provisions of U.S.
free trade agreements. United States Department
of Labor. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/ilab/
trade/agreements/nac.htm
United States Department of Labor. (2017b). Submis-
sions under the labor provisions of Free Trade Agree-
ments. Website United States Department of La-
bor. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions
United States Department of State. (2010). 2010 Country
reports on human rights practices. Washington, DC:
United States Department of State.
United States Department of State. (2017). Republic of
Korea 2016 human rights report (Updated version).
Washington, DC: United States Department of State.
United States Trade Representative. (2007). Correspon-
dence between US Trade Representative Schwab and
Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim, June 30, 2007.
Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file631
_12740.pdf
Van den Putte, L. (2015). Involving public society in social
clauses and the decent work agenda. Global Labour
Journal, 6(2), 221–235.
Van den Putte, L. (2016). The European Union’s trade and
labour linkage. Beyond the ‘soft’ approach? (Doctoral
dissertation). Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium.
Van Roozendaal, G. (2015). The diffusion of labour stan-
dards: The case of theUS andGuatemala. Politics and
Governance, 3(2), 18–33.
World Bank. (2017). Countries and economies. World
Bank. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/
country
World Trade Organization. (2017a). Regional trade
agreements. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
World Trade Organization. (2017b). International trade
and market access data. World Trade Organiza-
tion. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/statis_e/statis_bis_e.htm?solution=WTO&path
=/Dashboards/MAPS&file=Map.wcdf&bookmarkSta
te={%22impl%22:%22client%22,%22params%22:{%
22langParam%22:%22en%22}}
About the Author
Gerda VanRoozendaal is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and Interna-
tional Organization at the University of Groningen. In 2001, she received her PhD from the University
of Amsterdam. Van Roozendaal’s current research interest is in how (legitimate) institutions develop
and in the effectiveness of the linkage between trade agreements and labour standards.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 19–29 29
